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ABSTRACT—Since the early 1990s, the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals
have been divided on how to determine the citizenship of dissolved or
inactive corporations for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction. By the
beginning of the twenty-first century, courts of appeals addressing the issue
had settled on one of three conclusions: (1) citizenship should be
determined only by the corporation’s state of incorporation; (2) citizenship
should be determined both by the corporation’s state of incorporation and
its last principal place of business; or (3) citizenship should always be
determined by the corporation’s state of incorporation, but only be
determined by principal place of business on a case-by-case basis. In 2010,
the U.S. Supreme Court in Hertz Corp. v. Friend clarified the standard for
determining an active corporation’s principal place of business. Two years
later, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Holston Investments, Inc.
B.V.I. v. LanLogistics Corp. ruled that the reasoning of Hertz settled the
debate over the citizenship of dissolved or inactive corporations: only the
inactive or dissolved corporation’s state of incorporation determines
citizenship. This Note argues that although Hertz provided useful guidance
to the courts of appeals on how to determine the citizenship of dissolved
and inactive corporations, the Eleventh Circuit misinterpreted that
guidance. The Eleventh Circuit should have adopted a modified version of
an existing rule, which always factors both an inactive or dissolved
corporation’s state of incorporation and its last principal place of business
when determining citizenship. This test better accords with the Court’s
reasoning in Hertz, the intent behind the statutory definition of corporate
citizenship, and broader principles of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.
AUTHOR—J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2015; B.A.,
University of Pennsylvania, 2008. Many thanks to Professor Eugene
Kontorovich for his thoughtful assistance. All views and remaining errors
are my own.
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INTRODUCTION
In May 2007, shipping and aviation entrepreneur Paul Gartlan closed a
deal with LanLogistics Corporation to purchase subsidiary companies of
LanLogistics, including one called LanBox.1 LanLogistics was a Delawarechartered corporation that had its corporate headquarters in Florida.2
According to Holston Investments, Inc., B.V.I.—a British Virgin Islands
company with a Florida business affiliate—this violated a contract between
Holston and LanLogistics.3 Holston had previously purchased a separate
subsidiary from LanLogistics and it now argued the deal between Gartlan
and LanLogistics violated Holston’s contractual right of first refusal to
purchase LanBox.4 In the aftermath of the deal with Gartlan, LanLogistics
formally dissolved and forfeited its authority to conduct business in Florida
at the end of 2007.5 Five months later, Holston Investments and its Florida
affiliate sued LanLogistics in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
1

Holston Invs. Inc. B.V.I. v. LanLogistics, Corp. (Holston I), 664 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1260–61 (S.D.
Fla. 2009); see also About Us, SKYWORLD AIR CARGO, http://www.skyworldaircargo.com/aboutus.html [http://perma.cc/38YS-M9UJ] (background detail on Paul Gartlan).
2
Holston Invs., Inc. B.V.I. v. LanLogistics Corp. (Holston III), 677 F.3d 1068, 1069 (11th Cir.
2012) (per curiam).
3
Holston I, 664 F. Supp. 2d at 1260.
4
Id.; see also Albert P. Hernandez, WIKINVEST, http://www.wikinvest.com/stock/Skypostal_
Networks_Inc_(SKPN)/Albert_Hernandez_Chairman_Chief_Executive_Officer [http://perma.cc/345AP7DL] (summary of Holston Investments’ past dealings with LanLogistics).
5
Holston III, 677 F.3d at 1070 n.1.
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District of Florida under diversity jurisdiction for breach of contract.6 At
the time of the lawsuit, all parties seemingly agreed that the federal court
had the requisite diversity jurisdiction to hear the case: LanLogistics’s
supposed Delaware citizenship was diverse from the plaintiffs’ Florida and
British Virgin Islands citizenship.7
Over two years after the action in federal court commenced, the
federal district court issued judgment for the plaintiffs on the breach of
contract claim.8 Only after the supposed disposition of this straightforward
state law claim did the case transform into the latest battle over the
citizenship of inactive or dissolved corporations for federal diversity
jurisdiction.
Soon after receiving an adverse judgment, LanLogistics moved to
vacate the judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the
two parties’ citizenships were not truly diverse at the time the lawsuit was
filed.9 For the first time, LanLogistics brought to the trial court’s attention
that Florida had been its principal place of business at the time of the deal
with Gartlan that gave rise to Holston’s claim.10 LanLogistics now argued
that its late-2007 dissolution did not change the fact that, at the time the suit
was filed, LanLogistics was a citizen of both Delaware and Florida.11
Because there had been Florida citizens on both sides of the suit,
LanLogistics now argued that diversity jurisdiction had never existed and
the federal district court had no authority to enter or enforce its judgment
on the breach of contract claim.12
The federal district court faced clearly suspect circumstances: how
convenient that a defendant with an adverse judgment hanging over its
head coincidentally remembered that it was also a Florida citizen.
Nonetheless, the court also faced the unwavering obligation under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss a case if the court “at any time”
determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction.13 Had the trial court,
from beginning to end, presided over a case without ever having subject
matter jurisdiction, or were these newly revealed facts irrelevant to the
court’s jurisdiction?
Congress is constitutionally permitted to give federal courts
jurisdiction over state law cases when the case involves citizens of different
6

Holston Invs. Inc. B.V.I. v. LanLogistics, Corp. (Holston II), 766 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1328 (S.D.
Fla. 2011).
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id. at 1328–29.
10
Id. at 1329.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3).
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states.14 Since 1958, Congress has bestowed upon corporations a sort of
dual citizenship when it comes to diversity jurisdiction. To determine
whether a case involving a corporation may properly be heard in federal
court under diversity jurisdiction, a corporation is considered to be a citizen
both of the state in which it incorporated and the state in which it has its
“principal place of business.”15 Determining an active corporation’s
principal place of business has proven to be a difficult task,16 but the
meaning of “principal place of business” becomes particularly cryptic in
the case of dissolved or inactive corporations.
The trial court in Holston Investments Inc. B.V.I. v. LanLogistics,
Corp. had no precedent from its own Eleventh Circuit to address the
meaning of principal place of business in this context, but instead faced a
three-way circuit split. The Second Circuit determined the citizenship of
inactive corporations by looking to the corporation’s state of incorporation,
as well as its last principal place of business activity.17 The Third Circuit
only recognized the corporation’s state of incorporation, reasoning that a
dissolved or inactive corporation can have no principal place of business.18
The Fifth and Fourth Circuits have always looked to the corporation’s state
of incorporation, but then conduct a “totality of the circumstances” analysis
to determine if the corporation’s last principal place of business should be
considered.19 Since the emergence of the three-way circuit split, the
Supreme Court, in Hertz Corp. v. Friend, settled how federal courts
determine an active corporation’s principal place of business, which is by a
“nerve center” test.20
Analyzing the split, as well as Hertz, the Holston trial court joined the
Third Circuit: LanLogistics was only a citizen of Delaware at the time the
lawsuit was filed.21 Therefore, the trial court had diversity jurisdiction and
could leave the judgment against LanLogistics undisturbed. A year later,
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the trial court’s ruling on the jurisdiction

14

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012). For a district court to exercise diversity jurisdiction, it must also
conclude that the amount in controversy in the given lawsuit is over $75,000. Id. § 1332(a); see also
13E CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3602 (3d ed. 2009 &
Supp. 2014) (for a general description of diversity jurisdiction).
16
See discussion infra Part II.A.
17
Wm. Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick Developers S., Inc., 933 F.2d 131, 141 (2d Cir.
1991).
18
Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. Hansen, 48 F.3d 693, 696 (3d Cir. 1995).
19
See Athena Auto., Inc. v. DiGregorio, 166 F.3d 288, 291 (4th Cir. 1999); Harris v. Black
Clawson Co., 961 F.2d 547, 550–51 (5th Cir. 1992).
20
559 U.S. 77 (2010) (adopting the “nerve center” test for determining a corporation’s principal
place of business).
21
Holston II, 766 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1330–33 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
15
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question,22 making it the most recent court of appeals to enter the circuit
split and the first to do so since the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hertz.
This Note argues that the Holston court should have resolved the
ambiguity over dissolved or inactive corporate citizenship by adopting a
slightly modified version of the Second Circuit’s rule, which would make
dissolved and inactive corporations citizens of both their state of
incorporation and their last “nerve center.” Unlike the Holston court’s
adopted framework, this rule would more clearly accord with relevant
statutory text, administrative efficiency concerns, and relevant legislative
history; the three factors considered in Hertz.
Part I of this Note provides an overview of federal diversity
jurisdiction as it relates to corporations and the emergence of a circuit split
over how to determine the citizenship of inactive and dissolved
corporations. Part II examines the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hertz, and its
relation to Holston and the current three-way circuit split. Part III argues
that the Eleventh Circuit erred in siding with the Third Circuit and should
have instead adopted a modified version of the Second Circuit’s rule. There
is no clear justification for a dissolved or inactive corporation to receive a
forum option that Congress would not have allowed were the corporation
active. The argument that the Eleventh Circuit’s approach is favorable due
to its ease of application fails, both because the approach bucks the intent
of Congress by allowing for a blanket expansion of diversity jurisdiction
and because little supports the proposition that a modified Second Circuit
approach would be particularly burdensome administratively.
I.

EXPLAINING THE SPLIT

A cursory review of the origins of diversity jurisdiction and the
evolving manner in which courts and Congress have understood how
diversity jurisdiction is properly exercised over corporations will help
contextualize the circuit split over dissolved and inactive corporations.
A. Early Diversity Jurisdiction
The Constitution extends the judicial power of federal courts to
“[c]ontroversies . . . between [c]itizens of different [s]tates.”23 Congress is
not obligated to grant the federal courts this type of jurisdiction. Rather,
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution allows Congress to define the scope
of lower federal court diversity jurisdiction as long as that scope does not
exceed the jurisdictional grant in Article III.24
22

Holston III, 677 F.3d 1068, 1071–72 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (affirming as to the subject
matter jurisdiction issue but reversing as to the trial court’s calculation of damages).
23
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
24
Id. art. I, § 8; Turner v. Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 10 (1799).
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The purpose of diversity jurisdiction centers around the Framers’
distrust of state courts or, at least, concern over the possibility that state
courts might not fairly adjudicate claims involving citizens of different
states.25 Whatever the exact purpose or purposes behind diversity
jurisdiction, the first Congress took action to grant the authority to the
newly created lower federal courts.26
Congress’s grant of diversity jurisdiction did not, however, direct how
a court should handle suits involving corporations. Without the aid of
Congress, the Supreme Court developed its own doctrine for dealing with
corporate citizenship. Chief Justice John Marshall penned the Court’s first
statement on the matter, reasoning that corporations were “invisible,
intangible, and artificial” and “certainly not a citizen.”27 Accordingly, a
court assessed the citizenship of each member of the corporation, rather
than the corporation as a standalone citizen.28 The Court overruled this
approach in 1844, holding that a corporation is a citizen of its state of
incorporation for jurisdictional purposes.29 For a number of decades after,
however, the Court struggled to settle whether or not this was always the
case.30
The Supreme Court’s doctrine eventually led to public discontent. In
the infamous Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow
Taxicab & Transfer Co. case, a company intentionally obtained its charter
in a different state from the state in which it conducted its business so that
it would have the option of litigating all of its claims in federal court.31 The
Court found that diversity jurisdiction existed, even though all but the
company’s incorporation papers indicated it was a citizen of the same state

25

See, e.g., Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809) (Chief Justice Marshall
discussing suspicions of state courts contemplated by the Constitution); see also James Madison,
Address at the Virginia Convention (June 20, 1788), in 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1412, 1414 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1993)
(arguing that diversity jurisdiction provides relief to out-of-state litigants from the administrative
deficiencies and delays of many state courts); Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity
Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 495 (1928) (reviewing primary documents from the time of the
Constitutional Conventions indicating the Framers were primarily concerned with hostile state
legislatures, rather than impartial state courts).
26
Even with diversity of citizenship, lower federal courts were unable to hear cases with an amount
in controversy not exceeding $500. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78.
27
Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 86.
28
Id. at 86–88.
29
Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 555, 559 (1844).
30
Compare Marshall v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 328–29 (1853) (establishing a
rebuttable presumption that a corporation is a citizen of its state of incorporation), with St. Louis & S.F.
Ry. v. James, 161 U.S. 545 (1896) (confirming that a corporation is a citizen of its state of incorporation
by irrebuttable presumption that its members are citizens of the same state).
31
276 U.S. 518, 523–24 (1928).
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as its opposition.32 The Court reasoned that existing jurisdictional law did
not require an inquiry into the intent behind a company’s choice to
incorporate in a particular state.33
Soon after Black & White Taxicab, members of Congress and scholars
began debating the most appropriate means for determining a corporation’s
citizenship.34 Mixed with a growing concern about the caseloads facing
federal courts, Congress took action to address the citizenship of
corporations in the late 1950s.
B. Congress Speaks on the Citizenship of Corporations
In 1958, Congress amended its diversity jurisdiction law to increase
the requisite amount in controversy and to define a corporation’s
citizenship as being both “any State by which it has been incorporated and
of the State where it has its principal place of business.”35 Congress had a
number of goals in passing this amendment. Perhaps most significantly,
Congress meant for the revisions to reduce the federal district courts’
caseloads.36 Using identical statements of purpose, the Senate and House
reports recommending the bill’s passage note that the number of civil cases
coming before federal district courts had “increased tremendously” in the
years leading up to 1958.37 The reports state that the changes increasing the
amount in controversy and addressing the citizenship of corporations would
ease the workload of the federal courts.38
Congress’s choice to address the citizenship of corporations in the
1958 amendment was driven by at least one other motive. The House and
Senate reports on the bill address a concern over the “fictional premise”
under which corporations had been permitted to utilize the federal courts.39
The reports note that the Court-crafted doctrine on the citizenship of
corporations “has given rise to the evil whereby a local institution, engaged
in a local business and in many cases locally owned, is enabled to bring its
litigation into the Federal courts simply because it has obtained a corporate

32

Id. at 524.
Id.
34
See Chi. Univ. Law Faculty, Comment, Limiting Jurisdiction of Federal Courts—Pending Bills,
31 MICH. L. REV. 59, 65–67 (1932) (discussing and assessing various bills in the Senate and House
regarding changes to diversity jurisdiction law in response to Black & White Taxicab).
35
Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, § 2, 72 Stat. 415.
36
For a detailed review of the hearings and reports of both the House and the Senate leading up to
the passage of the amendment, see Jack H. Friedenthal, New Limitations on Federal Jurisdiction,
11 STAN. L. REV. 213, 213–19 (1959).
37
S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 2–3 (1958); H.R. REP. NO. 85-1706, at 2–3 (1958).
38
S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 3; H.R. REP. NO. 85-1706, at 3.
39
S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 3; H.R. REP. NO. 85-1706, at 3.
33
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charter from another State.”40 The reports describe the unfairness that arises
when two local corporations are not provided the same choice of courts,
only because one of the corporations elected to obtain its charter from a
different state.41
Congress was also aware that a state charter’s grant of incorporation,
and thereby fictive citizenship, did not necessarily mean the purpose behind
the protections of diversity jurisdiction would be served when applied to
corporations. Concluding its remarks on the problem of the existing judgemade corporate citizenship law, the reports state, “It appears neither fair
nor proper for such a corporation to avoid trial in the State where it has its
principal place of business by resorting to a legal device not available to the
individual citizen.”42
The reports also reveal that bankruptcy law played a role in Congress’s
choice of “principal place of business” as the factor for determining a
corporation’s possible second state of citizenship, stating that the “principal
place of business” analysis would parallel with jurisdictional tests
employed by courts under the then-existing Bankruptcy Act.43 In relevant
part, the Bankruptcy Act granted jurisdiction over “persons bankrupt who
have had their principal place of business, resided or had their domicile
within their respective territorial jurisdictions for the preceding six
months.”44
One early scholarly review of the 1958 amendment noted, “Ample
[bankruptcy] precedent there was, but consistent precedent there was not.”45
Indeed, the precedent established under Bankruptcy Act cases did not
provide federal courts with sufficient guidance on the principal place of
business test for active corporations.46 As for inactive or dissolved
corporations, however, a couple of pre-1958 Second Circuit bankruptcy
decisions stand for two noteworthy principles.
First, debtors no longer engaging in business but instead only
“winding up” their business activity still have a principal place of
business.47 Second, debtor inactivity should not be an obstacle to
40

S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 4; H.R. REP. NO. 85-1706, at 4. Both reports cite the Black & White
Taxicab case immediately following the description of this evil.
41
S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 4; H.R. REP. NO. 85-1706, at 4.
42
S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 4; H.R. REP. NO. 85-1706, at 4.
43
S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 5; H.R. REP. NO. 85-1706, at 4.
44
11 U.S.C. § 11(a)(1) (1952).
45
James W. Moore & Donald T. Weckstein, Corporations and Diversity of Citizenship
Jurisdiction: A Supreme Court Fiction Revisited, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1426, 1439 (1964).
46
As will be discussed later in this Note, the Supreme Court did not issue a definitive statement on
the test until 2010. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010).
47
See In re Evans, 85 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1936) (Western District of New York court had principal
place of business bankruptcy jurisdiction over an individual debtor who had no active business concerns
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bankruptcy jurisdiction where it effectively removes one of the two forums
Congress intended to create for bankruptcy proceedings.48 Neither principle
clearly resolves the issue of whether an inactive or dissolved corporation
can have a principal place of business; however, the Second Circuit
principles arguably serve as the closest indicator of how Congress intended
for the dissolved and inactive corporation issue to be resolved. Pre-1958
bankruptcy courts used a functional interpretation of “principal place of
business” that gave effect to the intent of Congress.
Following the 1958 amendments, various federal district courts began
to pass on the issue of what impact inactivity should have on the
corporation’s citizenship.49 Almost forty years after the 1958 amendment,
circuit courts of appeals began to take up the issue.
C. A Circuit Split Emerges
A three-way circuit split emerged in the 1990s over how trial courts
should assess the citizenship of inactive or dissolved corporations. To
better understand the 2012 Holston court’s reasoning, it is worth taking a
closer look at the defining cases that led to the current three-way split.
The Second Circuit was the first circuit court to make a statement on
the citizenship of inactive or dissolved corporations for diversity
jurisdiction purposes.50 In Wm. Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick
Developers South, Inc., a construction company and its insurers sought to
pierce the corporate veil of a closely held Florida real estate developer and
recover a judgment rendered fifteen years earlier.51 The construction
company was an inactive corporation that had incorporated in Ohio, but
whose principal place of business when it had been active was Florida.52
The district court ruled that it was obligated to consider both the

but had conducted business in the Western District three years earlier and still maintained
correspondence with his attorney who interacted with the debtor’s creditors in the Western District).
48
Fada of N.Y., Inc. v. Org. Serv. Co., 125 F.2d 120, 121 (2d Cir. 1942) (per curiam) (New York
corporation that had been inactive over the months leading up to the involuntary bankruptcy proceeding
remained a citizen of New York).
49
Compare Gavin v. Read Corp., 356 F. Supp. 483, 486 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (arguing that even where
it failed to formally dissolve itself, a corporation is inactive and has no principal place of business once
it has sold all its assets, has no payroll, and is only “winding up its business affairs”), and Kreger v.
Ryan Bros., 308 F. Supp. 727, 729 (W.D. Pa. 1970) (arguing that a corporation’s principal place of
business cannot be a state where “only a flicker of corporate activity remains”), with Comtec, Inc. v.
Nat’l Technical Sch., 711 F. Supp. 522, 523–25 (D. Ariz. 1989) (arguing that the clear intent of
Congress, bankruptcy precedent, and use of conjunctive in § 1332(c) all support finding that a
corporation’s last principal place of business is determinative of a corporation’s citizenship).
50
Wm. Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick Developers S., Inc., 933 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1991).
51
Id. at 133–34.
52
Id. at 134.

251

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

corporation’s state of incorporation and its last principal place of business.53
Moreover, the district court concluded that an inactive corporation’s
principal place of business was the state in which the corporation
conducted its last business activity—in this case, Florida.54
The Second Circuit affirmed.55 Reviewing the policy and legislative
history behind the 1958 amendment in detail, the Passalacqua court
reasoned that allowing the citizenship of an inactive corporation to be
determined solely by its state of incorporation “would give [the
corporation] a benefit Congress never planned for them.”56 The court
supported its reasoning in part by reference to the Second Circuit
bankruptcy principle that a corporation’s inactivity does not alter its
citizenship.57 Although the Second Circuit did not address the “business
activity” test that the district court used to determine the inactive
corporation’s last principal place of business, it adopted the test a few years
later.58 This test would be used for determining the principal place of
business of both active and inactive or dissolved corporations and would
prove to be significant in the development of the circuit split.
Soon after, the Fifth Circuit ruled on the issue in a case, Harris v.
Black Clawson Co., which involved the allegedly wrongful death or severe
injury of three Louisiana workers.59 The case was originally brought in
Louisiana state court, then was removed to federal court.60 After the federal
court granted the plaintiffs leave to add new defendants, the plaintiffs
moved to remand the case back to state court. The plaintiffs argued that one
of the new defendants had had its principal place of business in Louisiana
at the time of the dispute, despite having been inactive for over five years
and incorporated in New York.61
The Fifth Circuit adopted the reasoning of two Pennsylvania federal
district court cases and ruled that the construction company did not have its
principal place of business in Louisiana; therefore, diversity existed.62 The
court used what is commonly referred to as the “total activity” test.63 Under
53

Wm. Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick Developers S., Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1261, 1263
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
54
Id.
55
Passalacqua, 933 F.2d at 141 (citing Fada of N.Y., Inc. v. Org. Serv. Co., 125 F.2d 120, 121 (2d
Cir. 1942)).
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Pinnacle Consultants, Ltd. v. Leucadia Nat’l Corp., 101 F.3d 900, 907 (2d Cir. 1996).
59
961 F.2d 547, 548–49 (5th Cir. 1992).
60
Id. at 549.
61
Id. at 549–50.
62
Id. at 550–51 (citing Gavin v. Read Corp., 356 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1973) and Kreger v. Ryan
Bros., 308 F. Supp. 727 (W.D. Pa. 1970)).
63
Id. at 549.
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this approach, a court balances the results of two tests: (1) the “nerve
center” test that assesses the location of the corporation’s headquarters and
primary decisionmakers; and (2) what is basically the Second Circuit’s
“business activities” test, which assesses the primary location of the
corporation’s business activities.64
The Harris court surveyed, but did not explicitly rebut, Passalacqua’s
discussion of the policy behind the 1958 amendment and how Congress
intended courts to look to bankruptcy law when addressing “principal place
of business” issues.65 Instead, the court reasoned that the Second Circuit’s
use of the business activities test did not comport with the Fifth Circuit’s
total activity test.66 By focusing solely on the inactive corporation’s last
business activity and not on other facts about the makeup of the
corporation, the Second Circuit’s approach could lead a court to find that
an inactive corporation had a principal place of business that, under the
Fifth Circuit’s total activity test, it would not have had while the
corporation was active.67 The Harris court therefore ruled that its total
activity test requires a court to consider an inactive corporation’s last
business activity, but not necessarily conclude that such activity is
dispositive in establishing the corporation’s principal place of business.68
The Harris court’s rejection of the Second Circuit’s approach
therefore had more to do with an underlying clash between tests used to
determine a principal place of business than it did with a reasoned rejection
of Passalacqua’s review of the policy and legislative history of the 1958
amendment. The Fifth Circuit may not have rejected the Second Circuit’s
rule had it known that the Supreme Court would eventually reject the total
activity test.
Three years later, the Third Circuit entered the fray in Midlantic
National Bank v. Hansen.69 The case dealt with a Pennsylvania couple that
defaulted on loans from a New Jersey lender used to purchase and start a
Delaware savings corporation.70 When the couple defaulted on their loans,
the then-existing federal Resolution Trust Corporation seized all of the
wholly owned savings corporation’s assets.71 According to the defendant
couple, the savings corporation became completely inactive following the
seizure, except for being a party to ongoing litigation.72 Six months after
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72

Id.
See id. at 550–51.
Id. at 551.
Id.
Id.
48 F.3d 693 (3d Cir. 1995).
Id. at 694–95.
Id. at 695.
Id.
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the seizure, the New Jersey lender sued both the couple and the allegedly
inactive savings corporation in federal court.73
The defendants sought to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, arguing that although the savings corporation had been
inactive for six months leading up to the lawsuit, its principal place of
business had been in New Jersey.74 The district court denied the motion,
and, on appeal, a Third Circuit panel affirmed.75 The Third Circuit, which
used a “corporate activities” test to determine an active corporation’s
principal place of business, reasoned that an inactive corporation has no
activity and therefore no principal place of business.76 The Midlantic court
surveyed circuit court case law and noted that its holding conflicted with
Passalacqua and Harris, as well as a number of district court decisions
from the Ninth Circuit.77
In adopting a test that categorically excludes the possibility that a
dissolved or inactive corporation could have a principal place of business,
the Midlantic court conceded that its holding could “result in the
subversion of the intent of Congress” in some cases.78 The court reasoned
that this possibility was outweighed by the plain meaning of § 1332(c)(1),
and emphasized that the provision’s use of the present tense “has” in “has
its principal place of business.”79 If Congress had wanted § 1332 to cover
inactive corporations, the court argued, it could have simply included “‘has
or has had’ its principal place of business.”80 Ultimately, the Midlantic
court reasoned that “the benefits of certainty and clarity [obtained] from the
‘bright line’ approach we adopt outweigh the potential for the harm
identified by the Second Circuit.”81 By the Midlantic court’s calculus, an
inactive or dissolved corporation getting undeserved access to federal
courts was less harmful than federal courts struggling to assess the
corporation’s principal place of business.
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D. Assessing the Split
To summarize, the divergent approaches to inactive or dissolved
corporations can roughly be characterized as follows:
TABLE 1:

Second Circuit

Fifth Circuit

Third Circuit

Test Used to Determine a
Corporation’s Principal Place
of Business at the Time the
Decision Was Rendered

Rule For Inactive/Dissolved
Corporate Citizenship

Business Activities

Both state of incorporation and
last principal place of business

Total Activity (weigh both
business activities and corporate
headquarters “nerve center”)

Always state of incorporation
and court should conduct caseby-case analysis of
corporation’s total activities to
determine if it is appropriate for
corporation to have principal
place of business citizenship

Corporate Activities

Categorically excludes
consideration of principal place
of business citizenship; a
dissolved or inactive
corporation is the only state of
incorporation

These varying interpretations of § 1332(c)(1) stemmed more from the
varying types of pre-Hertz principal place of business tests than from a
dispute over the contextual construction of § 1332(c)(1) and its legislative
history. The business activities, total activity, and corporate activities tests
used to determine the principal place of business of active corporations
allowed for different outcomes when dealing with a dissolved or inactive
corporation.
Soon after the Midlantic decision, the scant scholarly attention to the
issue of inactive and dissolved corporation citizenship emerged. One
notable review found all three circuit approaches to be unsatisfactory: each
was either over- or underinclusive so as to clash with Congress’s intent
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behind § 1332(c)(1).82 The Second Circuit’s business activities test, which
uses a corporation’s place of “last activity” for determining its principal
place of business, improperly allows a failing corporation to take its
winding-up activities to its state of incorporation, meaning that certain
circumstances would allow the corporation to insulate itself from state
court actions, even where the state court action could be entirely local in
nature.83 The Third Circuit’s approach flatly conflicts with Congress’s
intent by allowing for inactive or dissolved corporations to get undeserved
access to federal courts, and the Fifth Circuit’s approach provides too
vague a standard for courts to practically apply.84
Timothy Yuncker argues that suits involving inactive corporations will
become more commonplace, citing U.S. Department of Commerce
statistics indicating that more and more corporations fail each year.85 For
this reason, Yuncker argues that Congress should intervene and clarify
§ 1332(c) by adding a provision specifically covering inactive
corporations.86 Yuncker’s proposed statute would make an inactive
corporation a citizen of its last principal place of business, so long as the
cause of action before the court relates to conduct of the inactive
corporation that occurred within 180 days of the corporation becoming
inactive.87 If Congress were not to act, Yuncker advocates a modified
version of the Fifth Circuit’s approach, which would require a court to
factor in an inactive corporation’s last principal place of business unless the
law of the state under which the plaintiff seeks relief provides that a
defunct corporation can no longer be sued.88
Following the development of the circuit split in the mid-1990s, only
one other circuit court of appeals assessed the split before 2012, while
district courts continued to struggle over how best to address the issue.89
The Fourth Circuit in Athena Automotive, Inc. v. DiGregorio joined the
Fifth Circuit in 1999.90 The court reasoned that the Fifth Circuit’s total
82

Timothy J. Yuncker, Inactive Corporations and Diversity Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(c): The Search for a Principal Place of Business, 28 U. TOL. L. REV. 815, 829–34 (1997).
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Id. at 829–30.
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Id. at 831–34.
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Id. at 816–17.
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Id. at 834.
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Id. at 834–35.
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Id. at 836–38.
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See, e.g., Parker v. Moore, No. C 08-1896 PJH, 2008 WL 2220613 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 2008)
(district court in Ninth Circuit applying Fifth Circuit’s approach); see also Ball v. Dynamic Details Inc.,
Ariz., No. CV-06-1661-PHX-FJM, 2007 WL 778410 (D. Ariz. Mar. 12, 2007) (district court in Ninth
Circuit applying the Second Circuit’s approach); Hogwood v. Hearthstone Mgmt. Grp., No. Civ.A. 995208, 2001 WL 34387931 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 2001) (district court in Third Circuit applying the Second
Circuit’s approach).
90
166 F.3d 288 (4th Cir. 1999).
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activity test would best distinguish those inactive corporations that no
longer had any impact on their former locale and those whose windingdown activity was still significant at the time the suit was filed.91 The
Fourth Circuit rejected the Second Circuit’s categorical conclusion that an
inactive corporation must be a citizen of its last place of business.92 The
Fourth Circuit also rejected the Third Circuit’s approach because it would
lead to results “demonstrably at odds with the statute.”93
In assessing the split, Yuncker and the Fourth Circuit clearly sought a
rule soundly based in the text and legislative history of § 1332(c)(1).
Unfortunately, they did so at a time when much of the doctrine about how
to determine the principal place of business for both active and inactive
corporations was broadly open to question. Only the Supreme Court’s
recent clarification of the doctrine made it possible to push the issue of
dissolved and inactive corporation citizenship towards resolution.
II. HERTZ AND HOLSTON
The Supreme Court’s decision in Hertz settled how courts should
determine an active corporation’s principal place of business. The Court’s
reasoning also provides more general guidance on how courts should
handle issues involving diversity jurisdiction. Reviewing the Hertz decision
in detail therefore lays the groundwork for assessing the Eleventh Circuit’s
reasoning in Holston, which adopted the Third Circuit’s approach and
rejected the Second and Fifth Circuits’ approaches largely by reference to
Hertz.
A. Hertz’s Nerve Center Test & Bright-Line Reasoning
A corollary and much more robust circuit split over how to determine
an active corporation’s principal place of business arose soon after the 1958
enactment of § 1332(c)(1). Struggling to give meaning to the phrase
“principal place of business,” some circuits determined a corporation’s
principal place of business by focusing solely on the location of the
corporation’s headquarters or nerve center,94 some focused on the
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Id. at 291.
Id.
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Id.
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See, e.g., Wis. Knife Works v. Nat’l Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1282 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating
that the Seventh Circuit uses the nerve center test and searches for the corporation’s headquarters to
determine the principal place of business).
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corporation’s principal place of business activity,95 and others balanced the
two considerations96 to come to a case-by-case determination.
In Hertz Corp. v. Friend, former employees of the Hertz Corporation
brought a class action in California state court alleging violations of wage
and hours laws.97 Hertz removed to federal court, asserting that it was
neither incorporated nor had its principal place of business in California.98
By raw numbers, California represented the plurality of Hertz’s business
operations, sales figures, and payroll.99 Hertz argued, however, that its
corporate leadership and administration were centered in New Jersey and
that this should be the determinative factor for the location of its principal
place of business.100
After the Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that it
lacked diversity jurisdiction over the case, the Supreme Court entered the
fray.101 The Court began by noting the purpose of diversity jurisdiction—
reducing prejudice against out-of-state parties.102 It observed that many of
the factors that might indicate a concern over prejudice against
corporations, such as the corporation’s image, history, and advertising
practices, cannot easily be quantified.103 The Court openly questioned
whether any possible principal place of business test could consistently
protect a corporation against the biases it might or might not face in a state
court.104 The Supreme Court concluded, however, that the nerve center
approach of looking to where the corporation had its corporate
headquarters was the most preferable test, meaning Hertz’s principal place
of business was New Jersey.105 It rejected the business activities and
balancing tests because they were too unwieldy and contained so many
factors that even circuits purporting to follow the same test produced
different results.106
95

See, e.g., Tosco Corp. v. Cmtys. for a Better Env’t, 236 F.3d 495, 500 (9th Cir. 2001) (per
curiam) (stating that the Ninth Circuit only uses the nerve center test when the place of operations test
does not reveal the state in which a corporation’s business activity predominates).
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See, e.g., Teal Energy USA, Inc. v. GT, Inc., 369 F.3d 873, 876 (5th Cir. 2004) (stating that the
Fifth Circuit focuses on both the nerve center and the place of activities in determining a corporation’s
principal place of business); see also Amoco Rocmount Co. v. Anschutz Corp., 7 F.3d 909, 915 (10th
Cir. 1993).
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559 U.S. 77, 81 (2010).
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Id. at 81–82.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 82.
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Id. at 92.
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Id.
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Id. at 92–97.
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Id. at 90–92.
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The Court laid out three considerations that, “taken together,” led to
the uniform adoption of the nerve center test.107 First, the Court looked to
the text of § 1332(c)(1). The Court focused on the statute’s phrase: “State
where it has its principal place of business.”108 The Court viewed the use of
“place” in the singular rather than “places” as an indication that Congress
wanted courts to pick the most prominent place within a state that the
corporation did its business.109 Whereas business activity usually occurs in
many different places––and possibly in more than one state––the Court
reasoned that a corporation’s nerve center, such as a headquarters, is
typically perceived by the public as being one, particular place that is the
corporation’s “main place of business.”110
Second, the Court stated that “administrative simplicity is a major
virtue in a jurisdictional statute.”111 Adopting a complicated jurisdictional
test would waste time on nonmerit issues, encourage gamesmanship, and
lead to more appeals and reversals.112 A simple rule, in contrast, would
promote predictability in aid of a corporation’s business decisions and
increase the likelihood that a verdict or settlement will be based on the
substantive merits of the case.113
Third, the Court looked to legislative history. It noted that early
iterations of what eventually would become the 1958 amendments
contained a numerical test that would make a corporation a citizen of the
state in which it took in over half of its gross income.114 Because Congress
rejected this test as too difficult to apply, and because a business activity
test involved the same difficult application, the Court reasoned the nerve
center test best accorded with Congress’s intent.115
The Court acknowledged that the nerve center test could lead to results
that would conflict with the purpose of § 1332, such as a corporation whose
public face and activities are centered in New Jersey but whose corporate
headquarters are just across the border in New York.116 These situations, the
Court reasoned, were effectively collateral damage to a clear rule that
supports simpler jurisdictional administration and a more uniform legal
system.117 One scholar has interpreted Hertz as the latest signal of a recently
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117

Id. at 93.
Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 94.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 95.
Id.
Id. at 96.
See id.
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developed principle of statutory construction: the “anti-messiness”
principle.118 The anti-messiness principle favors tests that do not require
complicated factual inquiries.119 The merits of the principle and the
arguments of those who argue for the principle’s broad application to
federal jurisdiction is a matter of ongoing debate.120
B. Holston Harnesses Hertz
In the wake of Hertz’s adoption of the nerve center test, the Eleventh
Circuit Holston court leaned heavily on what it deemed to be Hertz’s broad
directive on how to analyze diversity jurisdiction issues. The Holston court
faced a Florida corporation suing a Delaware-chartered corporation that
clearly, under Hertz’s nerve center test, had once had its principal place of
business in Florida.121 Nonetheless, the Holston court found that
LanLogistics’s formal dissolution just months before broke off the district
court’s ability to factor LanLogistics’s principal place of business in a
diversity jurisdiction analysis.122
To determine the citizenship of the dissolved corporation before it, the
Eleventh Circuit in Holston clearly structured its analysis of the law by
assessing how the circuit split tests accorded with Hertz.123 The Holston
court, however, did not clearly go through all three of the Hertz
considerations. Instead, the court focused its attention on the benefit of
clear-cut rules, even those that conflict with the rationale behind § 1332.124
Similar to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Harris, the Holston court quickly
disposed of the Second Circuit’s approach to the issue, focusing on the fact
that Hertz rejected the Second Circuit’s use of the business activity test for
determining the citizenship of active corporations.125 The court reasoned
that because the Second Circuit used a business activity test, “a corporation
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Anita S. Krishnakumar, The Anti-Messiness Principle in Statutory Interpretation, 87 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1465 (2012).
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Id. at 1505–07; see also Jonathan Remy Nash, On the Efficient Deployment of Rules and
Standards to Define Federal Jurisdiction, 65 VAND. L. REV. 509, 511–13 (2012) (comparing preference
for rules for determining diversity jurisdiction to other areas of jurisdictional law that employ
standards).
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Compare Nash, supra note 119, at 512–13 (arguing for a rule-based approach to jurisdictional
inquiries checked by a standard-based abstention doctrine), with Scott Dodson & Elizabeth McCuskey,
Response, Structuring Jurisdictional Rules and Standards, 65 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 31 (2012)
(arguing that a rule-based approach to jurisdictional inquiries contains underlying ambiguities that call
into question the purported benefits of the approach).
121
See Holston III, 677 F.3d 1068, 1069 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
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Id. at 1071.
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could be considered a citizen of a state in which it was not a citizen before
dissolution.”126
The Holston court did not address, however, how Hertz could be read
to refute the broader rationale of the Second Circuit—to always factor an
inactive and dissolved corporation’s last principal place of business,
regardless of the specific test used to determine a corporation’s principal
place of business. Nothing in Holston addresses whether the Second
Circuit’s approach might be the most preferable if it used the nerve center
test instead of a business activity test to assess an inactive or dissolved
corporation’s last principal place of business.
Implicitly rejecting the Fifth and Fourth Circuits’ total activity
approach, the Holston court adopted the Third Circuit’s bright-line
approach of never considering a dissolved corporation’s principal place of
business.127 The court acknowledged that the Third Circuit’s test could lead
to results that were inconsistent with the purpose of § 1332.128 This was
acceptable, however, because of Hertz’s allowance of collateral damage in
the process of adopting a bright-line approach129: “This bright-line rule may
open federal courts to an occasional corporation with a lingering local
presence, but undeserved access to a fair forum is a small price to pay for
the clarity and predictability that a bright-line rule provides.”130 The
Holston court therefore ruled that a dissolved corporation has no principal
place of business.131
III. A MODIFIED SECOND CIRCUIT NERVE CENTER TEST
Before going into detail on why the Holston bright-line approach is
troublesome and a modified Second Circuit approach is preferable, I begin
with a recitation of facts borrowed from a suit decided in the early 2000s
that helps to show the real-world implications of the two approaches.
In 2001, a resident of California filed a complaint in California state
court against his former employer, Bay Area Foods, and its holding
company, Bay Area Holding.132 Up until roughly two years before the suit
was filed, the defendant corporations had operated twelve stores and
maintained their offices exclusively in California.133 Despite the apparent
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lack of diversity between the plaintiff and his former employer, the
defendants removed the case to federal court on the theory that Bay Area
Foods had been incorporated in Delaware and had ceased business
operations two years before the lawsuit.134 It would be difficult to describe
Bay Area Foods as anything other than the type of business Congress
hoped to exclude from federal courts in 1958: “a local institution, engaged
in a local business and in many cases locally owned.”135 Based on the
legislative history of § 1332(c)(1), it would seem Bay Area Foods should
not be “enabled to bring its litigation into the Federal courts simply because
it has obtained a corporate charter from another State.”136 Employing the
bright-line test adopted by the Holston court, however, Bay Area Foods
would get access to the federal courts because any undeserved access is
merely collateral damage to the benefits of the bright-line approach.
A more thorough look at the history of diversity jurisdiction and Hertz
reveals that this is a problematic outcome. Congress affirmatively acted to
restrict the ability of corporations to access federal courts in 1958.137
Congress was motivated both by administrative concerns and by the
unfairness of one local corporation getting federal court access that another
local corporation would not get merely because it chose to incorporate in
the state in which it conducts its business.138 Hertz perhaps stands for courts
adopting “non-messy” rules, but it does not instruct courts to ignore the
intent of Congress.
A modified Second Circuit approach would satisfy Hertz and more
closely align to the goal of § 1332(c)(1). Under this approach, a court
would establish an inactive or dissolved corporation’s principal place of
business by determining where it had its last nerve center (basically, its last
corporate headquarters). Unlike the business activity test employed by the
Second Circuit pre-Hertz, finding an inactive or dissolved corporation’s
last corporate headquarters would not be particularly fact-intensive or
administratively burdensome. For example, nothing in Holston or Sellers
indicates that either trial court would have struggled to determine the
inactive or dissolved corporation’s last corporate headquarters.139 Indeed, it
is hard to imagine different circumstances where it would be hard.
The Holston court claimed to be resolving the question of dissolved
and inactive corporate citizenship by applying the analytical framework
134
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used in Hertz to determine the appropriate principal place of business test.
As discussed previously, there is reason to question the fidelity of that
application.140 The Holston court did not clearly conduct the three-prong
Hertz analysis of statutory language, administrative simplicity, and
legislative history.141 Instead, the Holston court focused almost exclusively
on the administrative-simplicity prong.142 A thorough analysis of Hertz’s
three considerations reveals that, with minimal changes, the Second Circuit
has it right.
A. Hertz Prong One: Text of § 1332(c)(1)
The first prong involves an analysis of the statutory language of
§ 1332(c)(1). The Third Circuit in Midlantic arguably gave the most
thoughtful attempt at the plain meaning of § 1332(c)(1) and concluded that
the present tense use of “has” in “has its principal place of business” means
a corporation has to be in existence in order to have a principal place of
business.143 The Midlantic court rejected the argument that the conjunctive
use of “and” in § 1332(c)(1) was relevant in determining the citizenship of
an inactive corporation.144 While there could be endless arguments over the
meaning of “and,” a closer look at the Midlantic court’s “has” argument
indicates that its statutory language argument is lacking. Even a brief
review of Delaware corporation law shows that just because a Delawarechartered corporation has dissolved does not mean that it is by any means
“dead” and therefore incapable of having things in the present.145 A
dissolved corporation often has assets and liabilities for some time after
dissolution. Although it is perhaps more intuitive to think a dissolved or
inactive corporation cannot have a principal place of business, legally there
is no reason this is the case. This calls into question how the Midlantic and
Holston courts could so easily assume that a corporation, by dissolving or
becoming inactive, has totally ceased to exist and thereby lost its ability to
possess things in the present tense, including statutorily conferred
citizenship.
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The battle over dissolved and inactive corporations’ citizenship,
however, cannot and need not be won or lost by statutory construction
alone. This consideration proves to be inconclusive at best, meaning it is
appropriate to move on to the other two prongs of the Hertz analysis.
B. Hertz Prong Two: Administrative Simplicity
The Hertz second-prong consideration of administrative simplicity
dooms the Fourth and Fifth Circuits’ total activity approach. Hertz’s
rejection of the total activity and other fact-intensive tests clearly indicates
the Court would not adopt a rule that allows for case-by-case
considerations of a corporation’s activities.146
Both the Second Circuit and Holston applied bright-line tests. The
Holston court, however, reasoned that the Third Circuit’s bright-line test
was easier to apply since it did not assess the last activity of the inactive or
dissolved corporation in question.147 The most apparent flaw in this
reasoning is that, with only a minor adjustment to accord with Hertz’s
nerve center test, the Second Circuit’s Passalacqua rule would not be
significantly burdensome to apply. Under a modified Second Circuit rule, a
court would still always factor in a dissolved or inactive corporation’s most
recent principal place of business. The only difference would be that rather
than determining the corporation’s most recent principal place of business
by assessing the corporation’s business activity, the court would do so by
looking for the corporation’s last corporate headquarters.
There is no reason to think that determining a dissolved or inactive
corporation’s most recent corporate headquarters would be any more
burdensome than doing so for an active corporation. While this issue has
not widely been explored, one can more easily imagine a court struggling
to assess whether a corporation is actually inactive or dissolved than a court
struggling to assess a corporation’s most recent corporate headquarters. A
modified Second Circuit rule would accord with Hertz’s preference for
administrative simplicity and would give litigants all of the predictability
they could need: regardless of whether it is dissolved or inactive, a
corporation would be a citizen of the state where it most recently had its
corporate headquarters, as well as of the state where it incorporated.148 With
two out of the three Hertz considerations addressed, it remains unclear how
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the Third Circuit’s bright-line rule is materially more favorable under Hertz
than would be a modified Second Circuit approach.
C. Hertz Prong Three: Legislative History
The third Hertz consideration, legislative history, tips the scales in
favor of the modified Second Circuit approach. Three aspects of the
legislative history are relevant here: (1) the legislative history indicating
Congress’s primary concern behind enacting § 1332(c)(1) was to alleviate
federal court dockets; (2) the legislative history indicating Congress was
concerned about the evils of undeserved access to federal courts; and
(3) the bankruptcy-like scheme Congress envisioned would guide the
implementation of § 1332(c)(1).
As to the first aspect, neither rule is likely to practically address
Congress’s concern, at least by current trends in diversity suits coming
before federal courts. Contrary to Timothy Yuncker’s prediction,149 no
significant docket-load spike has occurred on account of inactive or
dissolved corporations. An admittedly inexact search of cases involving
disputes over an inactive or dissolved corporation’s citizenship suggests
that fewer than 100 such cases have come before the federal courts between
1990 and October 2013.150 Even if these sorts of cases are not common,
however, the fact remains that the adoption of the Holston rule across the
federal courts would result in at least some increase in federal cases: the
rule logically allows for more situations where a corporation can access
federal courts.
The second legislative history consideration decisively disfavors the
Holston court approach. Congress clearly expressed its desire to prevent the
“evil” of local corporations receiving diversity jurisdiction access to the
federal courts merely because they had made the decision to incorporate in
a different state.151 Particularly in situations like the Bay Area Foods case,
where there was no question that all actors and issues confronting the court
were decisively local in nature,152 the Holston rule would not accord with
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the clearly expressed desire of Congress to keep local disputes out of the
federal courts.
It is true that the nerve center test adopted in Hertz permits this same
evil. The difference between Hertz and Holston, however, is that Hertz
settled a dispute over many plausible principal place of business tests.
None of the tests considered by the Hertz court categorically excluded the
possibility of a corporation not having a principal place of business.
Instead, the varying tests would occasionally lead to a corporation
obtaining diversity jurisdiction under one test, but not the other, depending
on the facts of the case. In contrast, the difference between a modified
Second Circuit approach and the Holston approach is that one dictates that
an inactive or dissolved corporation is always only a citizen of its state of
incorporation, while the other at least allows the possibility of two states of
citizenships. Particularly because only Congress, not the federal courts, has
the authority to expand or contract diversity jurisdiction, federal courts
should disfavor an approach that would categorically permit an expansion
of diversity jurisdiction.
Rather than see how its rule would, on an institutional basis, make it
more likely for inactive or dissolved corporations to receive underserved
access to federal courts, it appears the Holston court might have been
distracted by the other “evil” it faced. Because the lower court in Holston
did not fully address subject matter jurisdiction concerns until after trial,153
using a different rule would have meant that two years of federal court
adjudication would have occurred for nothing: the judgment would have
had to be vacated and the whole case would have had to go to state court
for relitigation. Although nothing in the Holston opinions indicates the
Eleventh Circuit was outcome-determinative in its reasoning, it is
indisputable that a different outcome in the case would have been highly
undesirable from a judicial resource and equity viewpoint. The opposite
outcome would have meant that the Holston district court spent years
adjudicating a case it did not have jurisdiction over.154 Furthermore, the
district court’s ruling in favor of the plaintiff would have been meaningless
and the plaintiff’s claim would have had to be relitigated in state court.
Instead of its diversity of citizenship ruling, the clear takeaway from
Holston should be that no federal court should proceed with adjudication
until it is satisfied that jurisdiction exists.155 A modified Second Circuit test,
153
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Holston I, 664 F. Supp. 2d 1258 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (first reported district court decision in the
Holston case); see also Holston II, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1327 (final district court decision before appeal in
the Holston case).
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Federal courts “have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction
exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514
(2006).
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applied at the start of litigation, would provide the same sort of bright-line
rule used by the Holston court without allowing for the problematic results
already discussed.
Finally, a look to pre-1958 bankruptcy principles, which the 1958
Congress expressly referenced when adopting § 1332(c)(1),156 provides
additional support for a modified Second Circuit approach. The Second
Circuit’s pre-1958 bankruptcy jurisdiction principles indicate that courts
should interpret ambiguities in the meaning of “principal place of business”
by looking to what forums Congress intended to make available.157 The
1958 amendment’s use of the term is clearly meant to limit, not expand,
forum options.158 Accordingly, a modified Second Circuit approach is the
most appropriate.
Taken as a whole, the three Hertz considerations strongly support a
modified Second Circuit test. The test provides a bright-line rule that
reasonably resolves the ambiguity in the text of § 1332(c)(1) with the clear
intent of Congress as shown through the legislative history.
CONCLUSION
The Eleventh Circuit in Holston faced two unsavory options. The
court could have applied a thoroughly supported rule that would have
determined a dissolved or inactive corporation’s principal place of business
by a nerve center test. This first option would have required the court to
allow LanLogistics to escape an adverse judgment and render two years of
federal court litigation useless. The Holston court instead chose the second
unsavory option, which allowed it to preserve the trial court’s judgment at
the cost of applying a pre-existing, but insufficiently reasoned rule that
categorically allows all dissolved and inactive corporations to have their
citizenship determined only by their state of incorporation.
Courts should not follow the Eleventh Circuit’s decision to go with the
latter rule. Instead, a modified version of the Second Circuit’s holding in
Passalacqua—that a court must always determine a dissolved or inactive
corporation’s principal place of business by using a nerve center analysis—
best accords with the directives of the Supreme Court in Hertz and the
legislative history behind Congress’s statutory definition of a corporation’s
citizenship.
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See discussion supra Part I.B.
See discussion supra Part I.B.
See discussion supra Part I.B.
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